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Abstract 
In a context in which price uncertainty is likely to increase, expected market trends need to be 
taken carefully into account while negotiating international trade policy rules. This paper aims at 
analyzing  what  is  their  influence  on  the  use  of  policy  flexibilities  in  the  context  of  WTO 
agricultural negotiations. In particular, within the market access pillar, we focus on the selection 
of sensitive products. Our model, TRIMAG (Tariff Reduction Impact Model for Agriculture), 
defined at the 8-digit level, optimizes the domestic agricultural value added subject to a maximum 
number  of  sensitive  tariff  lines,  accounting  for  various  future  international  price  scenarios. 
Furthermore,  we  test  the  use  of  alternative  options  for  the  implementation  of  “tariff 
simplification”. Findings confirm that the future expected development of world  and domestic 
prices plays an important role in the selection of sensitive products, and that tariff simplification 
doesn’t affect the results, if provisions to ensure the neutrality of the exercise are put in place. 
Furthermore,  TRIMAG  can  be  considered as  a  tariff  aggregation  tool that  can  be  linked  to 






The recent developments of world prices brought renewed interest into the factors that 
drive  long  term  agricultural  prices  and  trade,  and  the  needs  of  future  international 
agricultural policy rules (see Sarris, 2009; Baffes and Haniotis, 2010). At the same time, 
they also made clear, on the one side, the relevance of the uncertainty about prices in the 
markets for agricultural inputs and outputs, and on the other of the “policy risk” resulting 
from  an  uncertain  international  context  (OECD,  2009).  In  this  respect,  a  successful 
conclusion of the Doha Round of WTO negotiations could avoid incentives to pursue 
non-cooperative strategies via the adoption of protectionist policies (Bouët and Laborde, 
2009). It is clear that the expected trends of world markets will need to be taken into 
account while negotiating international trade policy rules. In a world in which uncertainty 
and price volatility are likely to increase (Sarris, 2009), their analysis is essential for a 
successful elaboration of the negotiating strategy of the various countries.  
In this work, we aim at analyzing what is the influence of the development of world 
prices on the use of policy flexibilities in the context of WTO agricultural negotiations. 
The  current  basis  for  the  discussion  is  constituted  by  the  draft  modalities  agreed  in 
December 2008 (WTO, 2008). In particular, within the market access pillar, we focus on 
the  selection  of  sensitive  products.  According  to  the  general  “tiered”  formula,  tariffs 
classified  in  higher  “bands”  are  subject  to  proportionally  higher  cuts.  However, 
developed WTO members are allowed to select up to 4% of their tariff lines as sensitive
1. 
For these lines, the tariff cut shall be 2/3, 1/2 or 1/3 of the otherwise applicable formula. 
These gentler cuts must be compensated by the expansion of import tariff rate quotas 
(TRQs
2). According to the deviation chosen, the TRQ expansion shall be equal to 3%, 
3.5% or 4%, respectively, of the quantity of domestic consumption of the products 
concerned.  The  choices of each member country will be made available only at the 
scheduling phase.  For some developed countries, mostly net importers of agricultural 
products and with a highly protected agricultural sector, sensitive products are a key 
aspect of the negotiations. On the contrary, agricultural exporters argue that the effects of 
even a limited number of exceptions to the general rule could be remarkable. For all these 
reasons, the possibility of selecting sensitive products  has then drawn considerable 
attention in the empirical literature. Notably, it is a well known issue that some elements 
of uncertainty are very likely to affect the selection, such as the relative development of 
world and domestic prices (Gohin, 2008). In addition, various developments  of future 
world prices might  indirectly  affect  the  selection  of  sensitive  products,  through  their 
influence on other parameters of the modalities. In particular, it is the future evolution of 
world prices that will determine whether or not tariffs expressed in specific terms will 
have  to  be  converted  into  their  ad  valorem  equivalents,  an  issue  known  as  “tariff 
simplification”.  This  issue  might  be  relevant  for  countries,  like  Switzerland,  whose 
agricultural tariff schedule is composed only by specific tariffs. Specific provisions have 
been  set  to  ensure  the  neutrality  of  the  conversion  exercise.  However,  whether  the 
                                                 
1 See paragraphs 71 to 83 of the December 2008 draft modalities (WTO, 2008). Members with more than 30% of their tariffs in the 
top band can select up to 6% of sensitive lines.  
2 For an analysis of origin, operating and economic impact of TRQs see Skully (2001). Although, in principle, products without TRQs 
cannot be selected as sensitive, it could be possible for a very limited number of lines to create new TRQs (paragraph 83 in WTO, 
2008). 4 
 
implementation of tariff simplification might cause variations in the relative protection of 
the various goods, then affecting the selection of the sensitive products, is an empirical 
question. In the existing literature, various methodologies have been proposed for the 
selection of sensitive products (for example, see Jean et al., 2010; Listorti et al., 2011; 
Gohin, 2008). They mostly rely on the analysis of tariffs and trade flows. Although of a 
simple application even at a very detailed level (since the selection of sensitive products 
will have to be made at the tariff line level, or 8-digit in the Harmonized System, HS
3) 
they usually do not prov ide information concerning the impact of the selection on 
specific groups of stakeholders (notably, the agricultural production sector), nor allow to 
take into consideration future developments of world markets. On the contrary, this can 
be done by standard partial or general equilibrium models, but often with a relatively 
high level of aggregation, although some developments have been made in this respect 
(Gouel et al., 2010; Pelikan et al., 2010; Ramos et al., 2010; Binfield et al., 2009; Piketty 
et al., 2009; Gohin, 2008; Grant et al. 2008).  To fill this gap, we developed a model, 
TRIMAG (Tariff Reduction Impact Model for Agriculture), defined at the 8-digit level of 
the HS, that optimizes the domestic agricultural value added subject to a maximum 
number of sensitive tariff lines. For all possible combinations of tariff reductions, the 
effects of the consequent domestic price changes are estimated for about 90 agricultural 
commodities. Then, in a static context, the corresponding impact on the domestic add ed 
value of agricultural production is derived. The “optimal” selection of sensitive lines is 
the one minimizing this impact. Alternative future developments of domestic and world 
prices can also be tested. 
In this paper, we aim at verifying if, and to which extent, different future price scenarios 
influence the selection of sensitive products when tariff simplification is accounted for. 
The work is structured as follows: in section 2, tariff simplification is introduced. Section 
3 explains the functioning of TRIMAG. The results of the simulations are presented in 
section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Tariff simplification 
Many different kinds of import tariffs are notified in WTO members’ schedules (see for 
example Bouët et al., 2008). In this work we will refer only to specific and ad valorem 
tariffs. Specific tariffs are expressed as a fixed charge per physical unit of imports. They 
are relatively easy to apply and administer. However, the degree of protection that they 
grant varies inversely with the value of the imported good, implying that they become 
more protective when world prices go down (Bouët and Laborde, 2008). Analogously, 
specific tariffs impose relatively higher protection on lower-unit-value products and give 
exporters an incentive to ship higher quality products, affecting also the composition of 
imports (Ramos et al.,  2010). After the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture of 
1994, specific tariffs are still applied especially in the agricultural sector and in countries 
such as Switzerland, Japan, Malaysia and the European Union (Bouët et al., 2008). Ad 
valorem tariffs are instead expressed as a fixed fraction of the value of the product. They 
can distinguish among small differentials in product quality to the extent that they are 
                                                 
3 The Nomenclature of the Convention on the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System, or “HS Nomenclature”, 
elaborated under the auspices of the World Customs Organization, comprises about 5,000 commodity groups identified by a 6-digit 
code and arranged according to a legal and logical structure. The Swiss tariff schedule comprises additional 8-digit subdivisions. 5 
 
reflected in the product price. They maintain a constant relative rate of protection at all 
price levels; on the other hand, in absolute terms, the tariffs will vary according to the 
world prices and exchange rates. The use of ad valorem tariffs implies the administrative 
complexity of determining the value of the imported good (Carbaugh, 2009).  
WTO negotiations are based on bound tariffs, incorporated as part of a country schedule 
of concessions. The tariff rates charged at the border, that in practice determine trade 
flows, also called applied tariffs, can be at most equal to bound tariffs. In the remainder 
of this section, we will assume that bound tariffs are equal to applied tariffs.   
Within agricultural negotiations on market access, the Framework Agreement of July 
2004 (WTO, 2004) proposes the use of a “tiered” formula, in which tariffs classified in 
higher “bands” are subject to proportionally higher cuts. In order to allocate tariffs to the 
various  tiers,  the  Draft  guidelines  for  the  conversion  of  final  bound  non-ad  valorem 
duties into ad valorem equivalents (WTO, 2006) are intended to establish a common 
methodology for the calculation of ad valorem equivalents for the specific bound tariffs. 
In general, the determination of the ad valorem equivalents (or AVEs) depends on the 
import  prices  used  and,  if  applicable,  on  the  exchange  rate.  In  WTO  negotiations, 
agreement was reached over a methodology making use of 1999-2001 reference prices. 
Furthermore,  for  tariffs  that  are  not  expressed  in  ad  valorem  form,  these  AVEs  are 
relevant  also  in  another  respect:  indeed,  the  December  2008  version  of  the  WTO 
modalities sets out that “No tariff shall be bound in a form more complex than the current 
binding.  [...]”  (WTO,  2008;  paragraph  103  and  the  following).  In  the  negotiations’ 
jargon, this is what “tariff simplification” means. This provision reflects a widespread 
agreement over the fact that ad valorem tariffs are more transparent than specific tariffs. 
The AVEs agreed in  the course of WTO negotiations will then  also  be used for the 
conversion of the specific tariffs. Some indications on the methodology to be followed 
are included in Annex N of the December 2008 draft modalities (WTO, 2008). The text 
indicates  that  “non-ad  valorem  bound  tariffs  where  the  AVE  from  the  Agreed 
Methodology using the 99-01 base is comparable to the current AVE calculated using the 
average unit import value for the Member concerned [...] shall be converted to simple ad 
valorem tariffs [...]”. In this context, the term “comparable” is crucial. In fact, since the 
AVEs have been calculated by using the years 1999 to 2001 as a reference period, it is 
clear that the conversion of specific tariffs into ad valorem ones might not be a neutral 
exercise. For example, if the import prices at the time of conversion are higher than those 
of 1999-2001, the conversion of a specific tariff into its AVE determined with the 1999-
2001 prices might result in a sudden increase of the border protection in absolute terms. 
The contrary would apply if the current prices are lower than the reference ones
4. For this 
reason, the WTO draft modalities impose that comparability should be checked before 
implementing  the  conversion.  This  operation  shall  be  repeated  three  times:  at  the 
beginning, following and three years after the end of the implementation period. As far as 
the  definition  of  comparability  is  concerned,  Annex  N  only  provides  some  scarce 
indications. In a rather complex formulation
5, the text suggests to assess comparability by 
                                                 
4 It is important to notice that price variations between current and reference prices might also be due to the specific methodology 
used to determine prices for the calculation of the agreed AVEs. 
5 
Three footnotes explain that “the term “comparable” here shall be deemed to exist only where it can be demonstrated that the 
effective final tariff cut resultant from calculating the AVE on the basis of the average unit import value [...] would be no more than 
4.9 percent ad valorem percentage points less (i.e. higher) than the effective tariff cut would have been if based on the 99-01 base 
period” (WTO, 2008). 6 
 
looking at the resulting tariff cuts using the agreed and the current AVEs. This implicitly 
conveys information on the evolution of world prices from the reference period to the 
year in which the conversion is made. Indeed, if the effective tariff cut using the current 
AVE is much higher than the one considering the agreed AVE, indicating that world 
prices have decreased in the meanwhile, the conversion would result in higher cut than 
the one prescribed by the modalities;  and the other way round (a simple example is 
reported in Box 1). In this respect, the most obvious interpretation of Annex N is that the 
conversion  of  specific  tariffs  into  their  AVEs  should  be  implemented  only  if  the 
difference between the effective cut calculated using the agreed AVE and that using the 
current AVEs doesn’t exceed 4.9 percentage points
6.  
The comparability criterion could be satisfied or not even for similar products. This might 
lead to a very burdensome situation with high administrative and information costs for 
the  operators.  Our  aim  is  to  study  if,  and  to  which  extent,  tariff  simplification  by 
considering various possible world price scenarios might affect the selection if sensitive 
products. To the Authors knowledge, no similar studies have been conducted. 
 
Box 1: Example on the calculation of the effective cut. 
Bound specific tariff : 100 CHF / 100 kg 
1999-2001 reference price : 500 CHF /100kg  
The 99-01 agreed AVE is given by            
                
                        
The effective cut prescribed by the modalities being -50%, the final AVE shall then be equal to 10%. 
 
Case I 
Reference price at the time of conversion: 800 CHF /100kg 
The AVE at the time of conversion is then          
                
                         . 
The effective cut at the time of conversion is given by          
         
             
Since the current price is higher than the 99-01 price, the current AVE is lower than the agreed one. 
Reducing the current AVE to the final AVE requires a lower effort. 
 
Case II 
Reference price at the time of conversion: 400 CHF /100kg 
The AVE is at the time of conversion         
                
                       
And the effective cut at the time of conversion is          
       
           
Since the current price is lower than the 99-01 price, the current AVE is higher than the agreed one. 
Reducing the current AVE to the final AVE requires a stronger effort. 
 
3. The TRIMAG model 
In this section, the Tariff Reduction Impact Model on Agriculture (TRIMAG) will be 
briefly presented (for further reference, see Listorti et al., 2011). TRIMAG optimizes the 
domestic agricultural value added of production following the application of the tiered 
formula subject to a maximum number of sensitive tariff lines. Based on 8-digit data, the 
effects on domestic prices of the standard and of the sensitive tariff cut are assessed 
(section 3.1). The price effects of various combinations of sensitive lines are then derived 
                                                 
6 Rather surprisingly, in Annex N the band is set only to avoid that the real cut would not be too much lower than the cut foreseen in 
the modalities; here, we will assume that the suggested threshold will apply in both directions. 7 
 
at a more aggregated commodity level. The corresponding reduction of the added value 
of the domestic production is calculated (section 3.2). Finally, an optimization model is 
applied minimizing the loss of added value by selecting the best combination of tariff 
reductions subject to the maximum number of sensitive tariff lines (section 3.3). The 
implementation of tariff simplification (3.4) and of the effect of varying world prices 
(3.5) are finally described. 
3.1 Estimating the effect of tariff reductions at the 8-digit level 
The TRIMAG database contains  information  at the 8-digit level  on Swiss  tariffs, 
prices and import flows from the European Union (EU) and the Rest of the World (RW). 
In addition, domestic prices at the 8-digit level, the data on domestic consumption as 
calculated in the context of WTO negotiations and the values of domestic agricultural 
production  for  about  90  agricultural  commodities  (source:  Swiss  Federal  Statistical 
Office and Federal Office for Agriculture) are also included. In general, the average of 
the yearly values of the years 2004-2009 is used.  
Relying on the information available, a simple approach is taken for the estimation of 
the domestic price drop at the 8-digit level caused by the reduction of import tariffs. 
Firstly, the domestic price drop resulting from a given tariff drop is estimated separately 
for each of the importing regions (EU and RW) according to their specific import prices 
and to tariffs applied to their imports. We assume that the applied tariff after reduction is 
equal to the minimum between the reduced bound rate and the currently applied rate
7, and 
that reductions of the bound tariffs will have an effect only when the “water” contained 
both in the bound and in the applied tariffs is completely eroded. Provided bilateral trade 
flows exist, we make the simplistic assumption that the ratio between the domestic price 
and  import  price  plus  applied  tariff  stays  constant  over  time
8  (Armington,  1969). 
Secondly, the resulting effect on the domestic price is calculated by an import weighted 
average between EU and RW drops. For every tariff line, these calculations are repeated 
applying the general tiered formula with a capping at 100% ( f) and the gentler tariff cut 
granted by the sensitive product status, plus the exception from capping (s, applying the 
maximum possible deviation of 2/3)
9. In quota tariff lines, “tropical products” (paragraph 
148 of the modalities), tariff lines not included in the Attachment A and single tariffs 
with no TRQ assigned are not eligible as sensitive. 
3.2 From the tariff line to the commodity level 
In a nutshell, a CES framework is applied to aggregate price effects from 8-digit tariff 
lines to the agricultural commodity level (90 commodities). The 2302 tariff lines of the 
Swiss  schedule  are  classified  in  145  products  (90  basic  and  55  processed  products) 
according  to  their  substitutability  in  consumption.  For  each  product,  aggregate  price 
effects of various tariff reduction formulas applied at the 8-digit level are derived within a 
CES  framework.  Each  commodity  corresponds  to  one  basic  product  and  up  to  7 
processed  products.  Substitution  effects  between  processed  products  and  price 
                                                 
7 This is a widely used assumption. However, the initial applied rate is not the only possible counterfactual, since applied tariffs could 
be raised up to the new bound rate (see for example Bchir et al., 2006).   
8 This ratio reaches its lower value of one when there is water in the applied tariff.  
9 
In general, no AVE > 100% will be allowed at the end of the implementation period (they are then “capped” at 100%), although 
some exceptions are possible both for standard tariff lines, and for sensitive lines (see paragraph 76 of the modalities, and attached 
working paper W5). In this work, we ignore the possibility of selecting exceptions to capping besides the tariff lines which will be 
selected as sensitive, that are on the contrary assumed to be all exempted from capping. 8 
 
transmission from processed to basic products are considered. Price effects at commodity 
level are finally used to optimize the selection of sensitive lines. 
Put it more formally, first of all, the effect of tariff reduction at the 8-digit level is 
derived at a more aggregated product level. Clearly, heterogeneous changes in prices lead 
to changes in the consumption pattern due to substitution effects. All i =1…2302 8-digit 
tariff lines have then been classified in m= 1….145 product groups according to their 
degree of substitutability in consumption. Each product m contains i = 1…n tariff lines. 
The price index of m (pm) is calculated as a consumption (CONS) weighted average of the 
prices of the corresponding i tariff lines (equation 1). 
      
                                
           
                                    (1) 
psi is the expected price if the i tariff line is selected as sensitive, and pfi if the standard 
tariff cut is applied. I is an index function, equal to 1 if the i tariff line is selected as 
sensitive,  and  0  otherwise.  For  each  of  the  m  products,  there  are  then  α  =  2^n 
combinations of tariff cuts. Each of them requires a specific number of sensitive tariff 
lines and will yield a certain pm,α. Following Britz and Witzke (2008), the total utility of 
consumption  within  each  product  is  given  by  the  Constant  Elasticity  of  Substitution 
(CES) framework of equations (2) and (3)  
                        
    
  
       
  
    
                                             (2) 
                     
  
    
                           
                     
  
                             (3) 
Um,α is the utility associated to the consumption of product m, CONSi,α is the consumption 
of tariff line i when a certain combination of tariff cuts α is applied and σ > 0 is the 
elasticity of substitution
10. The parameter   i, often called share parameter, is used to 
calibrate  the  equations  to  the  observed  initial  situation.  The  tariff  line  with  highest 
consumption is selected as the numeraire (NUM). Equations (2) and (3) yield a square 
system, that allows deriving the consumption pattern for all possible combinations of 
prices. Consequently, the aggregate price effects of tariff reductions can be calculated.  
However, additional complexity arises from the WTO modalities. Whenever a tariff line 
is selected as sensitive, a certain expansion of its TRQ must be granted. The impact on 
domestic prices of this TRQ expansion should also be considered. As shown in Figure 1, 
assuming that Switzerland is a price taker, and considering that TRQs are binding
11, in 
Case 1, the lowering of the out of quota tariff from To to T1  causes out of quota imports to 
occur, and the domestic price, P0, to be reduced to P1 = Pw + T1. The TRQ expansion from 
Q0  to Q0 + dQ has no effect on the equilibrium price (although it clearly affects the quota 
rent). Case 2 shows that, if the TRQ expansion is “high”, we might end up in a situation 
where although the out of quota tariff is still relatively high, the domestic price decreases 
due to the market access expansion, i.e. P1 < Pw + T1
12. 
 
                                                 
10 
σ is assumed to be equal to 4. Various values of the substitution elasticities have been tested across all products (with 0.1 < σ <10).  
11 A quota is binding when it is set below the free trade level of imports; the quota is filled and no out of quota imports occur. 
12 For a diagrammatic supply and demand model on TRQs, see Skully (2001); de Gorter and Kliauga (2006). 9 
 
Figure 1. Price effects of TRQ expansion: an example  
 
Source: own elaboration 
 
The  price  drop  consequent  to  the  enlargement  of  the  TRQ  is  estimated  at  the 
aggregate product level  according to the m net import demand elasticity
13 and to the 
increase in imports, the latter simply assumed to be equal to the TRQ expansion
14, which 
in  turn  is,  according  to  the  modalities,  equal  to  a   certain  percentage  of  domestic 
consumption of the  i tariff lines selected as sensitive. The possible existence of out of 
quota imports (see Binfield et al., 2009) as well as of autonomous TRQ extensions is also 
considered. At this point, to calculate correctly the consequences on market access, we 
correct  the  aggregated  prices  derived  from  the  CES  framework  for  these  effects,  by 
taking for further analysis the minimum  m  price resulting from  the increased market 
access and the out of quota tariff reduction.  
For each of the m products, it is now possible to select those combinations of sensitive 
lines yielding the highest aggregate price pm,α at a given number of sensitive lines. This 
reduces the complexity of α = 2^n potential combinations of sensitive lines to α = n 
favorable combinations.  
At this point, the price effects of the m products (pm,α) need to be aggregated to the c 
commodity level (pc,α). Where applicable, the price transmission effects from processed 
products     
     to the base agricultural product     
     are considered. Every commodity is 
assigned a unique basic product m, and k = 1…z (z is at maximum equal to 7) processed 
products.     
     can simply be taken from the corresponding pm,α. Since several groups of 
processed products can be mapped to one commodity, a CES framework is applied to 
determine the processed averaged price     
     and the required number of sensitive lines 
in the k processed products.     
    is derived, by applying the same scheme of equations 
(1), (2) and (3), in which weights are given by current shares of use of the basic product 
(equations 6,7 and 8).  
As explained in equation (4), the model minimizes the number of required sensitive lines 
by searching over all possible     combinations in the k processed products corresponding 
to the same c commodity and ensures that the averaged price     
    is higher than the price 
of the basic product group for certain  .  
                                                                                                      (4) 
                                                 
13  Net  import demand  elasticities  have  been  calculated using  the  demand  and  supply  elasticities  of  Ferjani (2008)  and  import 
penetration ratios (see Sharma, 2006). They have been bounded between -0.1 and -20 (see Sharma, 2006). Sensitivity tests have been 
run by using the net import demand elasticities used by Ferjani (2008).  
14 Since import quotas for Switzerland are normally binding. 10 
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                                                         (7) 
      
                           
    
  
       
  
    
                                               (8) 
The model is solved for each of the favorable   combinations for the basic product, 
which gives the corresponding     favorable combinations for the processed products. In 
other words, each of the favorable combinations for a basic product will then also imply 
selecting  a  certain  combination  of  sensitive  lines  for  the  corresponding  processed 
products.  The  model  becomes  infeasible,  if  the      
    associated  with  the  maximal 
selection of sensitive lines is still lower than     
     (equation 5). In this case, the results 
corresponding  to  the  maximum  number  of  sensitive  lines  are  taken  for  further 
calculations.  Finally,  the  price  effect  on  the  agricultural  commodity  is  calculated  by 
assuming that the price transmission elasticity between processed and basic products is 
equal to the overall share of the use for processing of the basic product, but only if the 
processed price is lower than the price of the basic agricultural product (otherwise, the 
increase  in  the  margin  is  assume  to  be  fully  captured  at  the  higher  stages  of  the 
production chain; see equation 9 where weight indicates the share in use).
  
               
         
             
              
         
                       (9) 
3.3 The optimization mechanism 
All  c  agricultural  commodities  are  assigned  the  corresponding  value  of  domestic 
agricultural production. Finally, the best possible combination of tariff cuts is selected at 
the 8-digit level, by maximizing the sum over the c commodities of the added value of 
agricultural production
15 subject to a maximum number of sensitive lines (equation 10).  
                                
          
     
                                                 (10) 
s                                            
where Vc,t0 is the domestic added value of agricultural production of commodity c at 
time t0, and pc,t0 and pc,α are the prices of the c commodity before and after a certain 
combination  of  tariff  cuts  has  been  applied  to  its  corresponding  basic  and,  where 
applicable, corresponding processed products. The overall number of tariff lines subject 
to the sensitive cut cannot be above a certain share (x) of the overall number of tariff 
lines, N. To our knowledge, TRIMAG is the only existing model which focuses on the 
impacts on the domestic agricultural sector while optimizing the selection of sensitive 
products. 
   
                                                 
15 For each product m, production costs are assumed to be a fixed proportion of the value of domestic agricultural production, so that 
its percentage variations correspond to a percentage variation of the added value. 11 
 
3.4 Accounting for tariff simplification 
The TRIMAG policy scenario consists of a detailed application at the 8-digit level of the 
December 2008 draft version of the modalities (WTO, 2008). As mentioned already, all 
agricultural  tariffs  of  the  Swiss  schedule  are  specific.  If  tariff  simplification  is  not 
considered, the tariff cuts prescribed in the modalities are just applied according to the 
band of the corresponding AVEs. However, if tariff simplification is to be implemented, 
following Annex N (see section 2), in TRIMAG a specific tariff line is converted into its 
AVE equivalent if the “comparability check” is passed in at least one year amongst those 
from the beginning of the implementation period to three years after its end
16.  
3.5 Using alternative price outlooks 
TRIMAG simulations can be repeated by using various price development scenarios- 
notably, those provided by standard partial or general equilibrium models, such as the 
CAPRI agricultural model
17. This is important for at least three reasons. First of all, it is 
clear that the expected future behavior of domestic and world prices has an influence on 
the selection of sensitive products. For example, if domestic prices are expected to grow 
less than world prices, there will be a lower need for protection. Secondly, such future 
price scenarios could reflect the effects of the selection of sensitive products made by 
third countries, and might then be used to analyze its consequences on the Swiss choice. 
Thirdly, concerning tariff simplification, the whole comparability issue ultimately relies 
on the relative developments of domestic and world prices between the 1999 -2001 
reference years and the time of conversi on. We here want to verify if checking for 
comparability ensures the neutrality of the whole “simplification” exercise also in terms 
of the “optimal” sensitive products’ list.  However, as  far as  the use of various price 
outlooks is concerned, we have to keep in mind that most available price projections fail 
in  accounting  for  the  increasing  price  volatility  that  agricultural  markets  have  been 
experiencing in the most recent years. Such volatility could play a relevant role in the 
verification of “comparability”. Whereas specific instruments of analysis might be used 
in this respect, analysis with TRIMAG could however prove to be useful. 
4.  Model results 
The objective of this section is to analyze if and to which extent various future price 
developments have an impact on the selection of sensitive products by considering the 
implementation  of  tariff  simplification.  The  TRIMAG  policy  scenario  consists  of  a 
detailed  application  at  the  8-digit  level  of  the  December  2008  draft  version  of  the 
modalities  (WTO,  2008).  The  implementation  of  the  agreement  is  assumed  to  be 
completed between 2012 and 2016. The simulations have been repeated first by assuming 
that  current  price  relations  between  domestic  and  international  products  will  remain 
constant in time (pn), and, second, considering the price outlook for the EU, RW and CH 
prices  provided  by  CAPRI
18  (py).  In  both  cases,  various  alternatives  for  the 
implementation of tariff simplification have been considered: in the option called sn, all 
                                                 
16 Note that comparability is assessed by considering the tariff cut associated to each year of implementation. For this reason, even 
when world prices are stable, the effective cut might change over time. 
17 See Britz and Witzke (2008), and http://www.capri-model.org/.  
18 Extracted from CAPRI dataset in July 2010. 12 
 
tariffs  remain  expressed  in  specific  form;  in  sy,  tariff  simplification  is  implemented 
according  to  the  rules  currently  set  out  in  the  modalities (in  TRIMAG,  if  the 
comparability check is verified at least once between 2011 and 2018, then the tariff is 
converted in AVE); s1 is equal to sy, but the time horizon for checking comparability is 
limited to one single moment in time, the beginning of the implementation period (2011-
2013);  in  s2,  not  only  is  the  time  horizon  for  checking  comparability  limited  at  the 
beginning of the implementation period, but the tier for the conversion is extended to +/-
10 percentage points; finally, in sa, all tariffs are converted
19. Remembering that the main 
objective of the whole comparability exercise is to ensure that border protection is not 
distorted, options s1 and s2, in particular, attempt at exploring the possibility of reducing 
the administrative costs linked to its implementation thanks to only one conversion step. 
First of all, it is interesting to note that the use of the various tariff simplification options 
does not have a big impact on the number of tariff lines that are converted (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Number of tariff lines that are converted to their ad valorem form in the various price scenarios 
/tariff simplification options  
converted  sn  sy  s1  s2  sa 
pn  -  -  371  (16%)  166  (7%)  365  (16%)  1793  (78%) 
py  -  -  342  (15%)  166  (7%)  337  (15%)  1793  (78%) 
non converted 
               
  
pn  1793  (78%)  1422  (62%)  1627  (71%)  1428  (62%)  -  - 
py  1793  (78%)  1451  (63%)  1627  (71%)  1456  (63%)  -  - 
bound at 0  231 (10%) 
-100% cut  278 (12%) 
TOTAL                                               2302 (100%) 
 
Of the 2302 8-digit tariff lines of the Swiss schedule, 231 (10% of the total) are already 
bound at zero, and 278 (12% of the total) will have to be reduced to zero (tropical or in-
quota lines). In these cases, tariff simplification options have no effect. For the remaining 
lines,  in  sy,  around  15%  of  tariff  lines  are  converted  in  ad  valorem  in  both  price 
scenarios; the same occurs in the option s2, while for s1 the number of converted tariff 
lines is halved. In all simplification options, the number and the composition of lines that 
are converted keeps constant notwithstanding the various price scenarios considered. In 
terms of number of converted tariff lines, option s2 turns out to be equivalent to option 
sy. In all the considered options, the number of converted lines is however relatively low; 
it is clear that converting all tariff lines into ad valorem might distort the current structure 
of the border protection. However, one should keep in mind that accounting for price 
volatility might even substantially alter these findings. The whole comparability concept 
is based on the proximity of 1999-2001 base prices to current unit import values. In 
particular, assuming that world prices have risen in the past ten years, it is possible that 
increasing volatility might increase the number of lines that are converted as it would 
possibly make world prices temporarily closer to the 1999-2001 ones. 
As far as the selection of sensitive products is concerned, the use of various options for 
                                                 
19 Indeed, the current draft modalities state that, at the end of the implementation period, all specific tariffs might have to be converted 
into ad valorem (Par. 104 of WTO, 2008); but Annex N is not fully consistent with the modalities text in this respect. 13 
 
the implementation of tariff simplification plays a minor role (Table 2). TRIMAG selects 
sensitive products especially in Chapters 02 (meat), 04 (dairy products), 07 (vegetables), 
08 (fruit) and 16 (preparations of meat). When 4% sensitive lines are chosen, we can 
notice that both in pn and py, the selection between sn, sy, sy1, sy2 remains relatively 
stable. This would confirm that the tariff simplification exercise in all the three options is 
« neutral » for the degree of border protection associated to the various products.  
On the contrary, there are slight differences in the selection between  py and pn. For 
example, in the option py, less products are found in chapter 17. Indeed, other things 
equal,  CH prices  for sugar are projected to  grow less than EU and RW prices.  This 
confirms that the future evolution of domestic and world prices plays a relevant role for 
the selection of sensitive products. The same considerations apply to the case where 6% 
of  sensitive  lines  is  selected.  Interestingly,  in  py  the  model  doesn’t  reach  the  6%  of 
sensitive products. Notably, in py, in respect to pn, moving from 4%  to 6% of sensitive 
lines fewer sensitive products are found, and the 6% is not reached. For example, not 
many additional products are selected in Chapters 7 and 20 (vegetables and vegetable 
preparations); for these products, the CH prices are projected to grow less than the EU – 
RW prices. However, it must not be forgotten that these simulations do not take price 
volatility into account, but just assume linear development trends for the price series
20.  
Finally, it is interesting to note that, when all tariff lines are converted (option  sa), 
TRIMAG tends to find a lower number of sensitive products. In other words, the TRQ 
expansion might become too costly related to the additional protection effect. This might 
be interpreted as an indication that, in some cases, the current prices are higher than the 
1999-2001 reference ones, and then that simply converting all tariffs in AVE without 
accounting  for  comparability  could  leave  the  degree  of  border  protection  relatively 
higher, compared to the formula reduction applied to specific duties.  
 
Table 2. Number of tariff lines selected as sensitive in the various price scenarios /tariff simplification 
options  
   
4% sensitive products  6% sensitive products 
   
pn  py  pn  py 
Chapter  sn  sy  s1  s2  sa  sn  sy  s1  s2  sa  sn  sy  s1  s2  sa  sn  sy  s1  s2  sa 
02  Meat and edible meat offal  28  30  28  29  25  31  32  31  29  25  37  39  37  38  25  36  37  36  36  25 
04  Dairy products; eggs; honey  6  6  6  6  2  5  5  5  5  2  6  6  6  6  2  5  5  5  5  2 
07 
Edible vegetables and certain 
roots and tubers  20  19  20  20  26  22  20  22  20  19  37  36  37  37  30  22  20  22  20  19 
08  Edible fruit and nuts  10  8  10  8  7  9  10  9  10  7  10  10  10  10  7  9  10  9  10  7 
10  Cereals 
  1    1    1  1  1  1    1  1  1  1    1  1  1  1    11  Products of the milling industry  1  1  1  1              1  1  1  1              16  Preparations of meat or fish  8  8  8  8  6  6  6  6  6  7  9  9  9  9  6  7  7  7  7  7 
17  Sugars and sugar confectionery  4  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2    4  4  4  4  4  2  2  2  2   
20 
Preparations of vegetables, 
fruit, nuts  3  3  3  3  7  3  3  3  6  6  9  9  9  9  7  7  7  7  7  6 
22  Beverages, spirits and vinegar 
        1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1  1 
Total  80  80  80  80  78  80  80  80  80  67  115  116  115  116  82  90  90  90  89  67 
 
                                                 
20 Furthermore, tariff simplification is implemented assuming that the comparability tier holds in both senses. 14 
 
5. Concluding remarks 
Future price developments need to be taken into account while using policy flexibilities 
in the context of multilateral trade negotiations. The objective of this work is to analyse if 
and to which extent various future price developments have an impact on the selection of 
sensitive  products  by  considering  the  implementation  of  tariff  simplification.  We 
developed a model, TRIMAG, that minimizes the loss of the Swiss agricultural added 
value after implementation of the tariff reduction formulas, subject to the constraint of a 
maximum number of sensitive tariff lines. 
Some major considerations are possible. First of all, the relative evolution of domestic 
and world prices plays a role in the selection of sensitive products. When domestic prices 
are projected to come closer to international prices, there is a lower need for protection.  
Secondly, although price volatility is not accounted for in the present study, still some 
considerations emerge on the implementation of tariff simplification. By ensuring that 
“comparability “ is respected, the tariff simplification exercise can be implemented in a 
neutral  way.  This  “neutrality”  between  the  various  implementation  options  for  tariff 
simplification  is  here  assessed  looking  at  the  impact  on  the  selected  list  of  sensitive 
products.  In  this  respect,  the  differences  between  the  alternatives  considered  are  not 
remarkable. It is interesting to explore the possibility of reducing the administrative costs 
by checking for comparability less than three times over the implementation period, as set 
out by the current modalities. 
This  analysis  was  possible  thanks  to  a  model  using  8-digit  tariff  level  information. 
However, some aspects of TRIMAG need to be further explored, such as assumptions on 
consumer’s behavior (substitution effects, differentiation by origin) as well as on price 
transmission  between  the  various  commodities  and  along  the  food  chain.  Such 
methodological developments could contribute to a better understanding of the impact of 
trade policy flexibilities on the domestic agricultural sector. Furthermore, TRIMAG can 
be  considered  as  a  tariff  aggregation  tool  that,  according  to  various  tariff  reduction 
formulas, can provide inputs for agricultural simulation models that operate at a higher 
level of aggregation. 
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